This special section is concerned with the following question: What can brain activity measured by fMRI contribute to our understanding of cognition that goes beyond what can be learned using other methodologies? In this article, we address that question as well as a related question: What can theories of cognition contribute to our understanding of brain activity measured using fMRI that goes beyond what can be learned without the guidance of a cognitive theory? Both questions are worth asking because the arrow between the bloodoxygen-level-dependent (BOLD) signal and theories of cognition points in both directions.
fMRI Data → Cognitive Theory
It seems clear to us that fMRI can inform cognitive theories that make predictions about patterns of activity in the brain. Although not all cognitive theories fall into that category fMRI experiments can be designed to test the predictions of those that do. An example of a cognitive theory that has been informed in this manner by fMRI is the theory of embodied cognition, one version of which holds that cognition (e.g., episodic memory) is grounded in perception. This view is captured by the following quote from Wilson (2002): Mental structures that originally evolved for perception or action appear to be co-opted and run "off-line," decoupled from the physical inputs and outputs that were their original purpose, to assist in thinking and knowing… Phenomenologically, recalling an episodic memory has a quality of "reliving," with all the attendant visual, kinesthetic, and spatial impressions. (p. 633)
The embodied cognition theory of episodic memory predicts that the different perceptual areas of the brain that are active at encoding will be active again at retrieval. In agreement with this prediction, studies using fMRI have found that remembering the visual and auditory aspects of studied items elicits activity in the same regions of the visual and auditory cortex that were activated during the initial perception of those items (e.g., Wheeler, Petersen, & Buckner, 2000; see Gottfried, Smith, Rugg, & Dolan, 2004 for a related fMRI study involving the olfactory cortex). Note that the use of fMRI to test predictions like these involves capitalizing on what is already known about the brain's perceptual processing regions.
In addition to testing predictions about neural activity using fMRI, other predictions made by the theory of embodied cognition have been tested using behavioral methods (e.g., Brunel, Labeye, Lesourd, & Versace, 2009 ) and lesion methods (see , for a review). However, whereas fMRI experiments can be designed to test predictions about real-time neural activity in the brain, behavioral and lesion studies necessarily test qualitatively different predictions. Thus, in our view, fMRI can uniquely contribute to the understanding of cognition when it is used to test predictions about neural activity that happen to be made by a theory of cognition and that cannot be tested using other methods. The neural predictions can be specific in that they refer to activity in regions of the brain with known function (as in the case of embodied cognition) or they can be more general in that they predict, for example, that Task A and Task B will be associated with activity in different (but unspecified) regions of the brain because the two tasks rely on different cognitive processes. Specific predictions seem more compelling than general ones, but, either way, fMRI can be used to test those predictions. When fMRI is used for that purpose, brain activity is treated as the known quantity (so to speak), and the validity of the cognitive theory is treated as the unknown quantity, with the former being used to shed light on the latter.
Cognitive Theory → fMRI Data
The arrow between fMRI and theories of cognition also points in the other direction. That is, just as fMRI can inform theories of cognition, theories of cognition can inform fMRI. This is particularly true of studies that use fMRI to elucidate the functional neuroanatomy of cognition. Instead of testing the predictions of a cognitive theory, these fMRI studies rely on a cognitive theory to interpret neuroimaging data. In this case, the cognitive theory is treated as the known quantity, and the cognitive function of a particular region of the brain is treated as the unknown quantity. An example can be found in studies concerned with the relationship between the dual-process theory of recognition memory (Atkinson & Juola, 1974; Mandler, 1980 ) and activity in the medial temporal lobe, particularly the hippocampus. In general, dual-process theory holds that recognition can be based on a context-free sense of familiarity (e.g., when a face is familiar, but nothing else about the person comes to mind) or it can involve recollection (e.g., remembering where and when the familiar individual was last encountered). What role does the hippocampus play in recollection and familiarity? The answer is not yet known, and cognitive theories have been used in conjunction with fMRI-and with particular behavioral methods-to find the answer.
In a typical study of recognition memory, the participant's task is to distinguish "old" items that appeared on a recent list from "new" items that did not. To determine which memory process is supported by the hippocampus when a test item is recognized as being old, researchers can use fMRI to separately measure activity for recollection-based old decisions and activity for familiarity-based old decisions. However, to do so, some other method must first be used to sort recognition decisions into those that were based on recollection and those that were based on familiarity (and this is where a specific cognitive theory comes into play). One method that is widely used for this purpose is the remember-know procedure. In this procedure, for each test item that is recognized as old, participants are asked to directly indicate whether their decision was based on recollection (by saying "remember") or familiarity (by saying "know"). Studies using this procedure have consistently found that hippocampal activity is elevated for remember judgments but not for know judgments (e.g., Eldridge, Knowlton, Furmanski, Bookheimer, & Engel, 2000; Yonelinas, Otten, Shaw, & Rugg, 2005) .
What does this finding suggest about the role of the hippocampus in recollection and familiarity? The answer depends on the specific cognitive model that is used to understand the meaning of remember-know judgments and (therefore) the brain activity associated with them. For example, according to the dual-process signal-detection (DPSD) model (Yonelinas, 1994) , recollection is a discontinuous threshold process that either occurs for a test item (e.g., the participant remembers thoughts that were prompted by the item back when it was presented on the study list) or does not occur. If it does occur, the participant makes both a recollection-based decision (labeling the item as old) and a remember judgment. If it does not occur, and if the test item seems sufficiently familiar, the participant makes both a familiarity-based decision (labeling the item as old) and a know judgment. Thus, according to this account, remember and know judgments accurately distinguish between recollection-based and familiarity-based recognition decisions. If so, then the fact that hippocampal activity is selectively elevated for remember judgments provides evidence that the hippocampus selectively supports recollection. However, if the assumptions of the DPSD model are not correct, then the meaning of the measured brain activity would change. To illustrate that point, we next consider what the same neuroimaging results would mean according to a different dual-process model. Unlike the DPSD model, the continuous dual-process (CDP) model holds that recollection (like familiarity) is a continuous signal-detection process, not a discontinuous threshold process (Wixted, 2007; Wixted & Mickes, 2010) . For example, just as the familiarity of a face can vary over a wide range, so too can the clarity (and accuracy) of the recollected details that are associated with that face. In addition, because both processes are continuous variables that can range from weak to strong (and because both provide valid evidence of prior occurrence), the CDP model assumes that recognition decisions are ordinarily based on a combined memory signal consisting of both recollection and familiarity (not on one process or the other, as in the DPSD model).
If the CDP model is correct, then participants face a dilemma when asked to indicate which process-recollection or familiarity-served as the basis of their recognition decision. If, for example, recollection and familiarity both happen to be weak for a particular test item, yet, when combined, the
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two processes are strong enough for the item to be declared as old, should the participant say "remember" or "know"? Because there is no obvious solution, the CDP model assumes that participants say "remember" when recollection is strong (whether familiarity is weak or strong) and that they say "know" when recollection is weak (again, whether familiarity is weak or strong). If so, then remember judgments would, on average, be based on a stronger memory signal than know judgments and should therefore be associated with higher confidence and higher accuracy. Much evidence shows that this is indeed the case (e.g., see Dunn, 2004, and Wixted & Stretch, 2004 , for reviews). Thus, the fact that hippocampal activity is selectively elevated for remember judgments could simply mean that the memory signal, whether based on recollection or on familiarity, needs to be strong in order to be detected in the hippocampus using fMRI (Squire, Wixted, & Clark, 2007) . In agreement with this idea, Smith, Wixted, and Squire (2011) found that when steps are taken to equate confidence and accuracy for remember and know judgments at a high level (i.e., when recollection and familiarity are similarly strong), hippocampal activity is similarly elevated for both (see also Song, Jeneson, & Squire, 2011) .
Which view of the recollection process is correct: the discontinuous threshold view (in the DPSD model) or the continuous signal-detection view (in the CDP model)? Both behavioral studies (e.g., Wais, Mickes, & Wixted, 2008) and neuroimaging studies (e.g., Johnson, McDuff, Rugg, & Norman, 2009 ) have been designed to test the predictions of these two models. More often than not, the predictions of the continuous view have been supported. However, our main point is not that one model has been supported over the other. Instead, it is that the interpretation of the same activity measured in the hippocampus will change depending on which model is judged to be correct (based on independent tests of their predictions). This issue is not specific to fMRI but also applies to lesion studies, many of which also depend on the DPSD model to justify their conclusions (e.g., Fortin, Wright, & Eichenbaum, 2004; Sauvage, Fortin, Owens, Yonelinas, & Eichenbaum, 2008) . In fMRI studies and lesion studies that investigate the functional neuroanatomy of cognition, the validity of the interpretation lives and dies with the validity of the cognitive theory on which it depends.
fMRI Data ↔ Cognitive Theory
To this point, we have tried to illustrate how, sometimes, fMRI data can be used to test the predictions of a cognitive theory (fMRI data → cognitive theory), whereas, at other times, a cognitive theory can be used to interpret fMRI data (cognitive theory → fMRI data). These considerations invite an additional question: Can an fMRI experiment use measured brain activity to test a cognitive theory and then turn around and use that same cognitive theory to interpret the same brain activity? In principle, this might be possible when one has reasonably high confidence in both the validity of the cognitive theory and the meaning of the measured brain activity (based on independent prior evidence). In that case, a correspondence between the two might further increase confidence in both. However, if either the cognitive theory or the brain activity is treated as an unknown quantity to be elucidated by the experimental investigation, then trying to accomplish both objectives at the same time runs the risk of circular reasoning. Moreover, because it seems deceptively easy to convince oneself after the fact that one's preferred cognitive theory and one's preferred interpretation of brain activity both have high a priori validity, the risk of inadvertent circular reasoning under these conditions seems uncomfortably high to us. Thus, although we argue that the arrow between fMRI and theories of cognition points in both directions, we do not mean to suggest that it typically does so at the same time.
